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Abstract
How does patent policy a¤ect economic growth through human
capital accumulation and endogenous fertility? In this study, we de-
velop a scale-invariant R&D-based growth model to analyze an un-
explored interaction between intellectual property rights, endogenous
fertility, human capital accumulation and economic growth. We nd
that strengthening patent protection has (a) a positive e¤ect on tech-
nological progress, (b) a negative e¤ect on human capital accumulation
through a higher rate of fertility, and (c) an ambiguous overall e¤ect
on economic growth. Furthermore, a stronger cultural preference for
fertility strengthens the negative e¤ect of patent policy relative to its
positive e¤ect on economic growth. Finally, we calibrate the model
to provide a quantitative analysis on the relative strength of these
opposing e¤ects of patent policy.
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1 Introduction
How does patent policy a¤ect economic growth through human capital ac-
cumulation and endogenous fertility? To analyze this question, we develop a
scale-invariant R&D-based growth model. In the literature on R&D-driven
economic growth, there has been a very important debate about the presence
of counterfactual scale e¤ects in the rst-generation models, such as Romer
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). In re-
sponse to this critique, subsequent generations of R&D-based growth models
have been developed to remove the strong scale e¤ect (i.e., a positive relation-
ship between population size and long-run growth).1 In these scale-invariant
models, the long-run growth rate is either solely or partly determined by the
population growth rate that is assumed to be exogenous. However, in a more
realistic framework, the fertility rate should be treated as an endogenous vari-
able chosen by optimizing households. In this study, we rst develop a scale-
invariant quality-ladder endogenous-growth model with endogenous fertility
and human capital accumulation and then apply this growth-theoretic frame-
work to analyze the e¤ects of intellectual property rights on fertility, human
capital accumulation, technological progress, and economic growth. To our
knowledge, this interaction between patent policy, endogenous fertility, hu-
man capital accumulation and economic growth has never been explored in
the literature. Furthermore, in recent vintages of R&D-based growth mod-
els, the long-run growth rate is usually increasing in the population growth
rate (i.e., a weak scale e¤ect); however, even this weak scale e¤ect is not
supported empirically.2 Therefore, we follow Strulik (2005) to model human
capital accumulation that generates a negative relationship between fertility
and economic growth.
In the model, optimizing households choose the fertility rate by trading
o¤ the marginal utility of higher fertility against its marginal costs arising
from (a) foregone wages, (b) the dilution of nancial assets per capita, and (c)
the dilution of human capital per capita. We nd that strengthening patent
protection that increases the market power of rms weakens the foregone-
wage e¤ect and the human-capital-diluting e¤ect but strengthens the asset-
diluting e¤ect of fertility. On the one hand, weakening the foregone-wage
e¤ect and the human-capital-diluting e¤ect leads to a higher fertility rate.
1See Jones (1999) for an excellent review on these subsequent generations of R&D-based
growth models.
2See for example Strulik (2005) for a discussion.
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On the other hand, strengthening the asset-diluting e¤ect leads to a lower
fertility rate. We nd that the e¤ects of patent policy on the dilution of
nancial assets and the dilution of human capital cancel each other. As
a result, strengthening patent protection unambiguously increases fertility
through weakening the foregone-wage e¤ect, and this higher rate of fertility
reduces human capital accumulation, which in turn leads to a negative e¤ect
on economic growth. Together with the positive e¤ect of patent protection
on R&D and technological progress, the overall e¤ect on economic growth
is ambiguous. Furthermore, we nd that a stronger cultural preference for
fertility (i.e., a larger value for the fertility-preference parameter) tends to
strengthen the negative growth e¤ect of patent policy.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. Strength-
ening patent protection that increases the market power of rms raises the
share of income that goes to monopolistic prots giving rise to a conven-
tional positive e¤ect on R&D and technological progress. However, it also
reduces the share of income that goes to other factor inputs including labor.
As a result of lower wages, the opportunity cost of non-market activities de-
creases; consequently, households reallocate their time from labor supply to
non-market activities including childrearing. This is the weakening foregone-
wage e¤ect discussed above. The higher rate of fertility in turn reduces the
rate of human capital accumulation by crowding out parentstime and re-
ducing the amount of resources per child. Because economic growth is driven
by both technological progress and human capital accumulation, the overall
growth e¤ect of patent policy is ambiguous.
We also calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy to pro-
vide a quantitative analysis. We nd that the magnitude of the negative
growth e¤ect of patent policy through human capital accumulation crucially
depends on a preference parameter on fertility and is increasing in its para-
meter value. Given a reasonable parameter value for the US economy, the
negative e¤ect of patent policy on human capital accumulation and economic
growth is likely to be dominated by the positive e¤ect through technologi-
cal progress. However, as the strength of cultural preference for fertility
increases, the negative growth e¤ect of patent policy becomes quantitatively
signicant relative to the positive e¤ect. For example, Fernandez and Fogli
(2009) provide empirical evidence to show that preference on fertility varies
across culture and has a signicant e¤ect on fertility outcomes.3
3Fernandez and Fogli (2009) use the past total fertility rate in the country of ancestry
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Our study relates to the literature on endogenous fertility and R&D-
driven growth for which Growiec (2006) provides an excellent review.4 Jones
(2001) develops a semi-endogenous growth model with endogenous fertility
to analyze the emergence of rapid growth and demographic transitions.5 To
simplify their analysis, Jones (2001, 2003) and Growiec (2006) consider a
model in which the allocation of inputs to R&D is exogenously determined.
The present study di¤ers from Jones (2001, 2003) and Growiec (2006) by
developing a quality-ladder model in which both fertility and the allocation of
factor inputs are endogenously determined through the market equilibrium.
Therefore, our model follows more closely the footsteps of Connolly and
Peretto (2003), who develop an R&D-based growth model with vertical and
horizontal innovations to analyze demographic shocks and industrial policies
that a¤ect the costs of R&D and/or entry. However, our model di¤ers from
Connolly and Peretto (2003) by featuring human capital accumulation as well
as creative destruction that gives rise to the importance of patent breadth
that protects an innovation against previous innovations. Therefore, the
present study complements their interesting analysis by analyzing another
important set of industrial policy: the e¤ects of intellectual property rights
on fertility, human capital accumulation and economic growth.
Our study also relates to the literature on patent policy and economic
growth. The seminal study in the literature on optimal patent design is
Nordhaus (1969).6 While studies in this patent-design literature mostly an-
alyze patent policy in partial-equilibrium models, the present study follows
more closely a related macroeconomic literature by analyzing the e¤ects of
patent policy in a quantitative dynamic general-equilibrium model. The sem-
inal dynamic general-equilibrium analysis on optimal patent length is Judd
as a proxy for cultural preference on fertility and nd that second-generation Americans
whose ancestry is from countries with higher fertility rates tend to have more children.
4See also Barro and Becker (1989) for a seminal study on endogenous fertility in an
overlapping-generation model with exogenous growth.
5See also Jones (2003), who analyzes the e¤ects of an exogenous increase in the R&D
share of labor chosen by the government. He nds that this policy change increases growth
in the short run but decreases growth in the long run through a lower rate of fertility due
to a crowding-out e¤ect on labor supply. In the previous version of this study, see Chu
and Cozzi (2011), we also consider a semi-endogenous-growth version of our model with
endogenous fertility and derive a negative e¤ect of patent breadth on long-run growth
similar to Jones (2003) but our result is based on a higher rate of fertility through an
opportunity-cost e¤ect of lower foregone wages.
6See Scotchmer (2004) for a comprehensive review of this patent-design literature.
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(1985), who nds that the optimal patent length can be innite. Subsequent
studies by Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007)
show that the optimal patent length is usually nite in the Romer model due
to an additional distortionary e¤ect on intermediate goods that is absent in
Judd (1985).7 While this branch of studies focuses on characterizing the op-
timal patent length, another branch of studies in the literature analyzes the
e¤ects of other patent-policy levers on innovation and growth. See, for ex-
ample, Li (2001) on patent breadth,8 ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) on
forward patent protection and patentability requirement, Cozzi (2001) and
Cozzi and Spinesi (2006) on intellectual appropriability, Furukawa (2007,
2010) and Horri and Iwaisako (2007) on patent protection against imita-
tion, and Chu (2009) on blocking patents. Some of these studies nd that
strengthening patent protection may generate a negative e¤ect on innova-
tion, and this nding is consistent with the detailed case studies analyzed in
Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine
(2008). The present study contributes to this literature by analyzing a novel
e¤ect through endogenous fertility that patent policy reduces human capital
accumulation causing a negative e¤ect on economic growth.
Finally, this study relates to a growing literature on culture and economic
growth. A recent empirical study by Tabellini (2010) provides evidence that
cultural traits, such as trust, respect for others, condence in individual self-
determination, and emphasis on childrens obedience, have signicant causal
e¤ects on regional per capita income in Europe. Another interesting empirical
study by Alesina and Giuliano (2010) analyzes the e¤ects of family ties on
economic outcomes, such as home production and labor force participation
of women and youth. In terms of theoretical work, a seminal study by Galor
and Moav (2002) shows that individual preferences on o¤spring quality a¤ect
the speed of transition to sustained economic growth. A subsequent study by
Ashraf and Galor (2007) analyzes the relative advantage of two interesting
cultural characteristics, namely, cultural assimilation and cultural diversity,
at di¤erent stages of economic development. Another recent study by Chu
(2007) argues that cultural variation in entrepreneurial overcondence can
play a role in causing di¤erent rates of economic growth across countries. The
present study relates to this literature by showing that cultural preference
7See also Horowitz and Lai (1996).
8See also Chu (2011) for a quantitative analysis on uniform versus sector-specic opti-
mal patent breadth in a two-sector quality-ladder growth model.
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on fertility not only has a direct e¤ect on economic growth but it may also
have an indirect e¤ect on growth through intellectual property rights.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 derives the equilibrium allocation and analyzes the dynam-
ics of the balanced growth path. Section 4 considers the e¤ects of patent
policy on economic growth and social welfare. The nal section concludes.
2 A quality-ladder model with endogenous
fertility and human capital accumulation
In this section, we develop a scale-invariant version of the Grossman-Helpman
(1991) quality-ladder model. The key changes in our model are as follows.
First, we consider endogenous fertility instead of exogenous fertility following
the setup in Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) and Yip and Zhang (1997). Second,
we allow for variable patent breadth as in Li (2001) in order to analyze
the e¤ects of patent policy. Third, we remove the strong scale e¤ect through
diluting R&D inputs by the scale of the economy following Laincz and Peretto
(2006). In the literature, there are two seminal approaches to remove the
strong scale e¤ect. The rst approach is the semi-endogenous growth model
in which long-run economic growth is solely determined by the population
growth rate.9 The second approach is the second-generation model in which
long-run economic growth is determined by both the population growth rate
and the R&D share of labor.10 In our model, economic growth depends on
both the population growth rate and the share of human capital allocated to
R&D resembling a second-generation model.11 Finally, we introduce human
capital accumulation as in Strulik (2005) to generate a negative e¤ect of
fertility on economic growth. Given that the quality-ladder model has been
well-studied, we will describe the familiar features briey to conserve space
and discuss the new features in details.
9Early studies on the R&D-based semi-endogenous growth model include Jones (1995),
Kortum (1997) and Segerstrom (1998).
10Early studies on the second-generation R&D-based endogenous growth model include
Young (1998), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) and Peretto (1998).
11See Laincz and Peretto (2006) and Ha and Howitt (2007) for empirical evidence that
supports the second-generation R&D-based growth model.
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2.1 Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households. As is standard in the liter-
ature on endogenous fertility, households derive utility from fertility. Here we
consider a continuous-time setup similar to Yip and Zhang (1997). However,
considering a discrete-time setup with overlapping generations of households
as in Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) would not change our results. The inter-
generational utility of households is the discounted sum of per capita utility
across time.12 Specically, the utility function of a household is given by
U =
Z 1
0
e tu(ct; nt)dt, (1)
where u(ct; nt) = ln ct+ lnnt. ct is the per capita consumption of nal goods
(numeraire), and nt is the number of births per person at time t. Given Nt as
the size of population, the total number of births is
:
N t = ntNt. In this simple
model with zero mortality, nt is also the population growth rate.  > 0 is a
fertility-preference parameter, and  > 0 is the discount rate.
Each household maximizes (1) subject to the following asset-accumulation
equation.
:
at = (rt   nt)at + wtlt   ct. (2)
at is the amount of nancial assets per capita, and rt is the rate of return on
assets. An increase in nt reduces the amount of assets per capita, and we refer
to this e¤ect as the asset-diluting e¤ect of fertility. wt is the wage rate, and
lt is human-capital embodied labor supply. Each person has one unit of time
to allocate between fertility, work and education. The time spent on fertility
is given by nt= < 1, where  > 0 is a parameter that is negatively related to
the time cost of fertility.13 At time t, the stock of human capital per capita
is ht. Each person combines her remaining time endowment 1   nt= with
12See Growiec (2006) for an interesting discussion on alternative ways of modelling
endogenous fertility in the growth literature.
13We follow a common approach in the literature to assume that  is independent
of capital accumulation or technological progress; see also Yip and Zhang (1997) and
Connolly and Peretto (2003). Otherwise, as technology or human capital accumulates, 
increases causing a lower time cost of fertility, which in turn leads to a rising fertility rate
instead of a constant fertility rate (i.e., ruling out a balanced growth path). However, we
think it is reasonable that parental human capital contributes to the health and education
of children, and this positive e¤ect is captured by the law of motion for human capital per
capita in (4).
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her human capital ht for work lt and education et subject to
ht(1  nt=) = lt + et. (3)
Increasing nt reduces the amount of time available for work and education,
and this setup captures the foregone-wage e¤ect of fertility. The law of
motion for human capital per capita is
:
ht = et   (nt + )ht, (4)
where  >  is a productivity parameter for human capital accumulation.
ntht captures the human-capital-diluting e¤ect of fertility as in Strulik (2005).
The parameter   0 is the depreciation rate of human capital.
From standard dynamic optimization, the Euler equation is
:
ct
ct
= rt   nt   , (5)
and the consumption-fertility optimality condition is

nt
=
1
ct

at +

1

+
1


wtht

. (6)
This condition equates the marginal utility of fertility given by =nt to the
marginal utility of consumption (in response to a change in fertility) given
by [at + wtht (1= + 1=)] =ct. The rst term at=ct captures the asset-diluting
e¤ect of fertility, and this e¤ect is positively related to the value of assets
per capita. The second term  1wtht=ct captures the foregone-wage e¤ect of
fertility, and the third term  1wtht=ct captures the human-capital-diluting
e¤ect of fertility. Both of these e¤ects are positively related to the wage rate.
From dynamic optimization, we can also derive an equilibrium condition that
equates the returns on assets and human capital.
rt =
:
wt
wt
   + (1  nt=). (7)
We will show that this condition determines the equilibrium growth rate of
human capital.
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2.2 Final goods
Final goods are produced by competitive rms that aggregate intermediate
goods using a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator given by
Yt = exp
Z 1
0
lnXt(i)di

. (8)
Xt(i) denotes intermediate goods i 2 [0; 1]. From prot maximization, the
conditional demand function for Xt(i) is
Xt(i) = Yt=pt(i), (9)
where pt(i) is the price of Xt(i).
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated intermediate
goods. Each industry is temporarily dominated by an industry leader until
the arrival of the next innovation, and the owner of the new innovation
becomes the next industry leader.14 The production function for the leader
in industry i is
Xt(i) = z
qt(i)Lx;t(i). (10)
The parameter z > 1 is the step size of productivity improvement, and qt(i) is
the number of productivity improvements that have occurred in industry i as
of time t. Lx;t(i) is production labor in industry i. Given zqt(i), the marginal
cost of production for the industry leader in industry i ismct(i) = wt=zqt(i). It
is useful to note that we here adopt a cost-reducing view of vertical innovation
as in Peretto (1998, 1999).
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to a prot-maximizing price
given by
pt(i) = (z; b)mct(i), (11)
where  = zb > 1 and b 2 (0; 1) denotes patent breadth. In the original
Grossman-Helpman (1991) model, the patentholder is assumed to have com-
plete protection against imitation such that b = 1. Li (2001) considers a
14This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect in the literature. See Cozzi (2007) for
a discussion on the Arrow e¤ect.
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more general policy environment with incomplete patent protection against
imitation such that b 2 (0; 1). Here we follow the formulation in Li (2001).
From (9), the amount of monopolistic prot is
t(i) =

  1


pt(i)Xt(i) =

  1


Yt. (12)
Therefore, a larger patent breadth b increases the markup  and the amount
of monopolistic prot improving the incentives for R&D. For the rest of
this study, we use  to measure the strength of patent protection. Finally,
production-labor income is
wtLx;t(i) =

1


pt(i)Xt(i) =

1


Yt. (13)
Equations (12) and (13) show that strengthening patent protection increases
the share of prot income (i.e., t=Yt) and decreases the share of wage income
(i.e., wtLx;t=Yt). Through these e¤ects, patent policy a¤ects the equilibrium
rate of fertility.
2.4 R&D
Denote vt(i) as the share value of the monopolistic rm in industry i. Because
t(i) = t for i 2 [0; 1] from (12), vt(i) = vt in a symmetric equilibrium that
features an equal arrival rate of innovation across industries.15 In this case,
the familiar no-arbitrage condition for vt is
rtvt = t +
:
vt   tvt. (14)
This condition equates the interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset.
The asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic prot t, (b) potential capital
gain
:
vt and (c) expected capital loss tvt from creative destruction for which
t is the arrival rate of the next innovation.
There is a unit continuum of R&D rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. They hire
R&D labor Lr;t(j) for innovation. The zero-expected-prot condition of rm
j is
vtt(j) = wtLr;t(j), (15)
15We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilib-
rium. See Cozzi et al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium
to be the unique rational-expectation equilibrium in the quality-ladder growth model.
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where the rm-level arrival rate of innovation is
t(j) = 'tLr;t(j). (16)
To remove the strong scale e¤ect, we follow Laincz and Peretto (2006) to
specify that 't is decreasing in the scale of the economy. Specically, we
assume that 't = 'L
 1
r;t =(htNt)
,16 where htNt measures the scale of the
economy and the parameter  2 (0; 1) captures the negative duplication ex-
ternality commonly discussed in the literature; see for example Jones (1995)
and Jones and Williams (2000). Given Lr;t =
R 1
0
Lr;t(j)dj, the aggregate
arrival rate t of innovation features decreasing returns to scale in Lr;t.17
3 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fct; nt; ht; lt; Nt; Yt; Xt(i); Lx;t(i); Lr;t(j)g
and a time path of prices fpt(i); wt; rt; vtg. Also, at each instance of time,
 households maximize utility taking frt; wtg as given;
 competitive nal-goods rms produce fYtg to maximize prot taking
fpt(i)g as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-goods rms produce fXt(i)g and choose fLx;t(i); pt(i)g
to maximize prot taking fwtg as given;
 R&D rms choose fLr;t(j)g to maximize expected prot taking fwt; vtg
as given;
16In the previous version of this study, see Chu and Cozzi (2011), we consider a semi-
endogenous-growth version of our model by specifying 't to be decreasing in aggregate
technology. In that model, we nd that patent breadth has the same e¤ects on fertility as
in the current framework. However, the current framework is more general because long-
run growth depends also on the R&D share of human capital whereas this R&D share
only plays a role on short-run growth but not on long-run growth in the semi-endogenous
growth model. We would like to thank a referee for suggesting us to pursue the current
formulation.
17We assume constant returns to scale at the rm level in order to be consistent with
free entry and zero expected prot.
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 the market-clearing condition for human-capital embodied labor supply
holds such that ltNt = Lx;t + Lr;t;
 the market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that Yt = ctNt;
and
 the share value of monopolistic rms adds up to the total value of
household assets such that vt = atNt.
The aggregate production function is given by
Yt = ZtLx;t, (17)
where aggregate technology Zt is dened as
Zt = exp
Z 1
0
qt(i)di ln z

= exp
Z t
0
d ln z

. (18)
The second equality of (18) applies the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating
the log of (18) with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology
given by
gz;t 
:
Zt
Zt
= t ln z = (' ln z)

Lr;t
htNt

. (19)
As for the dynamics of the model, Proposition 1 shows that the economy is
always on a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path.
Proposition 1 Given a constant level of patent breadth , the economy im-
mediately jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path
along which each variable grows at a constant (possibly zero) rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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3.1 Balanced growth path
Given Proposition 1, we analyze the equilibrium allocation on the balanced
growth path in this section. On the balanced growth path, the arrival rate
of innovation is constant so that Lr;t and htNt must grow at the same rate.
The steady-state growth rate of technology is
gz = (' ln z)s

r , (20)
where we dene sr  Lr;t=(htNt) and sx  Lx;t=(htNt) as the shares of human
capital devoted to R&D and production, respectively.
Combining (13) and (17) yields wt = Zt=, which implies
:
Zt
Zt
=
:
wt
wt
=
:
ct
ct
+ nt + +    (1  nt=), (21)
where the second equality of (21) is derived by substituting (5) into (7). The
steady-state growth rate of consumption per capita is
gc = gy   n = gz + gh, (22)
where gy is the steady-state growth rate of Yt. In other words, our model
features two engines of growth (i.e., technological progress gz and human
capital accumulation gh). Substituting (22) into (21) yields
gh = (1  n=)  n    . (23)
Therefore, the growth rate of human capital per capita is decreasing in n.
The rst negative e¤ect (i.e.,  n=) arises from the crowding out of fertility
on time endowment. The second negative e¤ect (i.e.,  n) is the human-
capital-diluting e¤ect of fertility. Finally, the growth rate of consumption ct
is
gc = gz + gh = (' ln z)s

r   (1 + =)n+      . (24)
Equation (24) shows that economic growth gc is increasing in sr and decreas-
ing in n. In other words, by introducing human-capital accumulation into the
semi-endogenous growth model, we are able to generate a negative relation-
ship between fertility and economic growth as in Strulik (2005). Furthermore,
in our model, endogenous fertility generates an additional negative e¤ect on
human capital accumulation through the crowding out of time endowment
that is absent in the Strulik exogenous-fertility model.
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Using (13) and (15), we derive the rst equation for solving the steady-
state equilibrium n as follows.
vtt
Lr;t
= wt =
Yt
Lx;t
, sr
sx
= (  1) 
+ 
, (25)
where  = 'sr . The second equation for solving the model can be obtained
by combining the time-endowment constraint and the labor-market clearing
condition.
1  n

=
lt
ht
+
et
ht
= sr + sx +
et
ht
. (26)
From (4), the steady-state growth rate of ht is
gh 
:
ht
ht
= 
et
ht
  n  . (27)
Equating (27) and (23) yields
et
ht
= 1  n

  

, (28)
which describes a negative relationship between n and et=ht. Using (28), we
can simplify (26) to


= sr + sx. (29)
Combining (25) and (29) yields the following polynomial function that solves
the equilibrium sr as an implicit function in .
'sr + (s

r)
1  = '(  1)=. (30)
Taking the total di¤erentials of (30), we obtain
dsr
d
=
'sx
'+ (1  )(sr) 
> 0. (31)
Therefore, the R&D share sr of human capital is increasing in , and this
is the standard positive e¤ect of patent breadth on R&D through a larger
share of monopolistic prots. Equations (29) and (31) together imply that
the production share sx of human capital is decreasing in .
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4 E¤ects of strengthening patent protection
To solve for the equilibrium fertility rate n, we make use of the consumption-
fertility optimality condition in (6).18

n
=
at
ct
+
1


wtht
ct

+
1


wtht
ct

=

  1


1
+ '(sr)
+
1


1
sx

+
1


1
sx

, (32)
where sr and s

x are implicit functions in . Equation (32) determines the
equilibrium n as a function in . As for the comparative statics of n with
respect to , we need to consider all the general-equilibrium e¤ects of  on
n. The rst term on the right-hand side of (32) captures the asset-diluting
e¤ect of fertility. For a given sr, a larger patent breadth strengthens this
e¤ect by increasing at=ct (i.e., the ratio of asset value to consumption) and
leads to a lower rate of fertility. The second term on the right-hand side of
(32) captures the foregone-wage e¤ect of fertility. For a given sx, a larger
patent breadth strengthens this e¤ect by decreasing wtht=ct (i.e., the ratio
of wage income to consumption) and leads to a higher rate of fertility. The
third term on the right-hand side of (32) captures the human-capital-diluting
e¤ect of fertility. For a given sx, a larger patent breadth also strengthens this
e¤ect by decreasing wtht=ct and leads to a higher rate of fertility.
Although there are two positive e¤ects and one negative e¤ect, we nonethe-
less derive an unambiguously positive e¤ect because the human-capital-diluting
e¤ect and the asset-diluting e¤ect of fertility cancel each other. To see this
result, we rst di¤erentiate =n with respect to  and then substitute (25)
and (31) into the resulting expression to obtain
@=n
@
=
1


1
+ '(sr)

1

   '
'+ (1  )(sr) 

  1
sx

1

+
1


1

  '
'+ (1  )(sr) 

. (33)
It can be shown that
@=n
@
< 0, s

x
+ '(sr)
<

'(sr) + 

1

+
1


. (34)
18It is useful to recall that at = vt=Nt.
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Applying (25) and (30), this inequality further simplies to 1= > 0. There-
fore, unless the foregone-wage e¤ect is absent (i.e.,  !1), n is increasing
in  for  2 (0; 1).19 Di¤erentiating (24) with respect to  yields
@gc
@
=
@gz
@|{z}
>0
+
@gh
@|{z}
<0
= (' ln z)
@(sr)

@| {z }
>0
  (1 + =)@n

@|{z}
>0
. (35)
Furthermore, (32) and (33) imply that the value of @n=@ is strictly in-
creasing in , whereas (30) implies that @(sr)
=@ is independent of . We
summarize our main results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 An increase in the strength of patent protection  increases
the equilibrium fertility rate n and decreases the growth rate gh of human
capital. However, it also increases the R&D share sr of human capital and the
growth rate gz of technology. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of  on the growth
rate gc of consumption is ambiguous. If the fertility-preference parameter 
is su¢ ciently large, then the negative e¤ect of  on gc through g

h dominates
the positive e¤ect through gz .
Proof. Proven in the text.
Furthermore, we nd that as households value fertility more (i.e., a larger
), they choose a higher rate of fertility n. As a result of higher population
growth, the economy exhibits a lower growth rate of human capital per capita.
Therefore, a stronger cultural preference for fertility also has a direct negative
e¤ect on economic growth.
Proposition 3 An increase in the fertility-preference parameter  increases
the equilibrium fertility rate n and decreases the growth rates of human cap-
ital and consumption fgh; gcg.
Proof. First, note that a larger  increases n from (32). Then, note that a
larger n reduces gh from (23) and g

c from (24).
19In the previous version of this study, see Chu and Cozzi (2011), we consider the special
case of  = 1 and nd that n is independent of  in this knife-edge case.
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4.1 Welfare analysis
In this section, we analyze the welfare e¤ects of strengthening patent pro-
tection. First, we derive the welfare of households in the market equilib-
rium. Then, we also derive the rst-best optimal allocation. On the balanced
growth path, (1) simplies to the following welfare expression that applies to
both the market equilibrium and the rst-best allocation.
U =
1


ln c0 +
gc

+  lnn

, (36)
where c0 is initial consumption per capita. Using ct = Yt=Nt and (17), initial
consumption can be expressed as
c0 = Z0h0sx, (37)
where Z0 and h0 are the initial exogenous levels of technology and per capita
human capital, respectively. The steady-state growth rate of consumption is
gc = gz + gh, where gz is given by (20) and gh is given by (27). The resource
constraint in (3) can be re-expressed as
1 =
n

+ sr + sx +
e0
h0
, (38)
where we will normalize h0 = 1 and simply use e  e0=h0 for convenience.
Substituting some of the above conditions into (36) and dropping the
exogenous terms yield
U =
1


ln sx +
' ln z

sr +
e  n

+  lnn

. (39)
Under the market equilibrium denoted by superscript *, di¤erentiating (39)
with respect to patent strength  yields

@U
@
=
@ ln sx
@| {z }
 
+
' ln z

@(sr)

@| {z }
+
+


@e
@|{z}
 
  1

@n
@|{z}
+
+ 
@ lnn
@| {z }
+
. (40)
Strengthening patent protection has the following e¤ects on welfare. First,
it decreases the production share sx of human capital, which has a negative
e¤ect on welfare by reducing the initial level of consumption. Second, it
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increases the R&D share sr of human capital, which has a positive e¤ect
on welfare by increasing the growth rate of technology. Third, it decreases
human-capital investment e as implied by (28) giving rise to a negative
e¤ect on welfare through a lower growth rate of human capital. Finally, it
increases the fertility rate n, which has a negative e¤ect on welfare through a
lower growth rate of human capital as well as a direct positive welfare e¤ect.
Whether the overall e¤ect of  on U is positive or negative is an empirical
question that we will explore in the quantitative analysis in the next section.
As for the rst-best allocation denoted by superscript **, we maximize
(39) subject to (38) and obtain
sx =


, (41)
(sr )
1  =
' ln z

, (42)
n =

1 + =
, (43)
e = 1 

sx + s

r +
n


. (44)
The comparative statics with respect to the parameters are quite intuitive.
Comparing (41) and (29), we nd that sx > s

x because s

r > 0; in other
words, the decentralized market allocates an insu¢ cient share of human cap-
ital to production. Comparing (42) and (30), we nd that if  ln z    1,
then sr > s

r because (s

r)
1  < '(  1)= from (30). In other words, R&D
underinvestment occurs if either  or z is su¢ ciently large. Intuitively, a
larger  implies a smaller degree of the negative duplication externality and
a larger z implies a larger degree of the positive externality from z to tech-
nological progress gz as shown in (20). Given R&D underinvestment, patent
policy  may help to mitigate this market failure. As for the comparison
between n and n, we rst note that the equilibrium fertility rate n is
increasing in  from Proposition 2. Then, from (32),
lim
!1
n =

1 + =
, (45)
because lim!1 sr = 0 from (30) and lim!1 s

x = = from (29). Therefore,
as  approaches one, n approaches n. Given that n is increasing in
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, we have n > n for  > 1; in other words, the fertility rate chosen by
households under the decentralized equilibrium is suboptimally high. Finally,
as  approaches one, we have (a) n = n, (b) sx = s

x , and (c) s

r > s

r = 0;
therefore, lim!1 e > e. As  increases above one, e decreases towards
e, whereas sr increases towards s

r ; however, s

x and n
 deviate from their
optimal values. As  becomes su¢ ciently large, e may fall below e, and sr
may rise above sr . In the quantitative analysis, we will compute the welfare
changes from increasing patent strength .
4.2 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to examine quantitatively the e¤ects
of patent breadth on technological progress, fertility, human capital accu-
mulation, economic growth and social welfare. In the previous section, we
show that strengthening patent protection has both positive and negative ef-
fects on economic growth. In this section, we calibrate the model to examine
which e¤ect is likely to dominate.
There are nine structural parameters f; ; ; ; ; '; ; z; g that are rele-
vant for this numerical exercise. First, we set the discount rate  to a standard
value of 0.04. As for the depreciation rate of human capital, Stokey and Re-
belo (1995) consider a range between 3% and 8% to be reasonable for the US
economy, so we set  to an intermediate value of 0.055. As for the returns to
scale in the R&D process, Kortum (1992) estimates a parameter similar to
 and nds that its value is 0.2; therefore, we set  to 0.2.20 We consider a
range of values for the fertility-preference parameter  2 f1; 2; 4; 8g. Finally,
we use the following ve empirical moments to pin down the values of the
remaining ve parameters. We consider a long-run population growth rate
of 1% for the US economy, and the equilibrium condition for n is given by
(32). As for the arrival rate of innovation, we use the estimate in Laitner
and Stolyarov (2011) to set  = '(sr)
 to 0.17, which also takes on an inter-
mediate value within the range considered by Acemoglu and Akcigit (2011).
20Jones and Williams (2000) consider a lower bound for  to be about 0.5 based on
empirical estimates for the social rate of return to R&D. In this study, we intentionally
choose a small value for  in order for TFP growth gz not to be overly responsive to the
R&D share of GDP. In our calibration, the elasticity of TFP growth with respect to the
R&D share of GDP is about 0.2. If we set  to a higher value of 0.5, the elasticity increases
to about 0.5. However, while R&D share of GDP in the US has been steadily rising, TFP
growth shows no signicant upward trend.
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We set the equilibrium R&D share of GDP to 0.03 for the US economy, and
this share is given by Sr  wLr=Y in the model.
Sr =

  1



+ 
. (46)
We set the growth rate gz = 
 ln z of total factor productivity (TFP) to 1%
and the growth rate gc = g

z + g

h of consumption per capita to 2%. In other
words, we consider a useful benchmark in which technological progress and
human capital accumulation contribute equally to economic growth. Given a
chosen value for each of f; ; ; g, these ve empirical moments determine
the values of f; '; ; z; g respectively. The calibrated parameter values are
reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibration
  '  z 
1:0 0:048 0:443 1:038 1:061 0:145
2:0 0:026 0:465 1:038 1:061 0:185
4:0 0:018 0:500 1:038 1:061 0:266
8:0 0:014 0:550 1:038 1:061 0:427
Given these calibrated parameter values, we consider a counterfactual
policy experiment by increasing patent breadth such that  increases from
1.038 to 1.061 (i.e., patent breadth b = ln= ln z increases from 0.64 to 1.00).
The numerical results are reported in Table 2. We see that Sr (i.e., the R&D
share of GDP) increases by over one half. On the one hand, strengthening
patent protection has a positive e¤ect on technological progress. For all values
of , the arrival rate of innovation increases from 0.170 to 0.186 whereas the
growth rate of technology increases from 1% to 1.095%. On the other hand,
strengthening patent protection raises the fertility rate from 1% to roughly
1.003% and decreases the growth rate of human capital. The magnitude of
the decrease in gh depends on  and is increasing in its parameter value.
For a small value of , the positive e¤ect of  through technological progress
dominates the negative e¤ect through human capital accumulation giving
rise to a positive overall e¤ect on economic growth gc . For a su¢ ciently
large value of , the negative e¤ect of  through gh becomes quantitatively
signicant and may completely o¤set or even dominate the positive e¤ect
through gz giving rise to a slightly negative overall e¤ect on g

c . As for social
welfare, we nd that it increases and the welfare gain U (expressed in
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terms of equivalent variation in consumption ow) is slightly over 0.5% of
consumption per year. If we decompose the welfare e¤ects according to (36),
the welfare gain mostly comes from (a) a higher consumption growth rate gc
when  is small and (b) a higher fertility rate n when  is large; in all cases,
the welfare gain is partially o¤set by a reduction in initial consumption c0.
Table 2: Policy experiment ( = 1:061)
 Sr 
 gz n
 gh g

c U
1:0 0:047 0:186 1:095% 1:002% 0:991% 2:085% 0:569%
2:0 0:047 0:186 1:095% 1:003% 0:978% 2:073% 0:567%
4:0 0:047 0:186 1:095% 1:003% 0:954% 2:048% 0:561%
8:0 0:047 0:186 1:095% 1:003% 0:904% 1:999% 0:551%
 = 1:038 0:030 0:170 1:000% 1:000% 1:000% 2:000% n=a
From this quantitative analysis, we conclude that whether the positive or
negative e¤ects of patent policy on economic growth dominates depends on
the empirical value of the fertility-preference parameter . Here we consider
the calibrated values of n= (i.e., the fraction of time spent on fertility) to nar-
row down the empirical range of . Using the calibrated values of  in Table
1, one can show that  2 f1; 2; 4; 8g corresponds to the following calibrated
values of n= 2 f0:21; 0:38; 0:57; 0:73g. According to the American Time Use
Survey from 2005 to 2009, an average person in households with youngest
child under six years old spends less than 3 hours per day for child caring as a
primary activity.21 Assuming an average of 16 hours of non-sleeping time per
day, the fraction of time spent on child caring in the US data is close to the
lower bound of the calibrated values of n= implying that the empirical value
of  should be reasonably small in the US. Therefore, for the US economy,
the positive e¤ect of patent policy through technological progress is likely to
dominate the negative e¤ect through human capital accumulation. However,
as the strength of cultural preference for fertility increases, the negative e¤ect
of patent policy through human capital accumulation becomes quantitatively
signicant and o¤sets the positive e¤ect through technological progress.
21Persons in households with older children spend even less time for child caring.
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5 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a scale-invariant quality-ladder model with
endogenous fertility and human capital accumulation to analyze the e¤ects
of patent policy on economic growth. We nd that although strengthening
patent protection has a positive e¤ect on technological progress, it also has a
negative e¤ect on human capital accumulation. As a result, the overall e¤ect
on economic growth is ambiguous. In the quantitative analysis, we nd that
the relative magnitude of these two e¤ects depends on the empirical value
of a preference parameter on fertility. Calibrating this parameter to a rea-
sonable value for the US economy, we nd that the positive e¤ect through
technological progress is likely to dominate the negative e¤ect through human
capital accumulation rendering a positive overall e¤ect on economic growth.
However, for a culture that has a stronger preference for fertility, the nega-
tive growth e¤ect of patent policy through endogenous fertility and human
capital accumulation would be quantitatively more signicant. This theo-
retical result implies that if developing countries have a stronger preference
for fertility than developed countries, then the negative e¤ect of strength-
ening patent protection on economic growth would be larger in developing
countries, and this implication may partially explain why some developing
countries are reluctant to strengthen patent protection.22 Therefore, an in-
teresting direction for future research would be to empirically examine these
e¤ects across countries.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
In this proof, we rst derive an autonomous system of two di¤erential
equations in sr;t and sx;t. Then, we show that this dynamic system is char-
acterized by global instability. Because sr;t and sx;t are jump variables, they
must jump to the steady state. Finally, we show that stationary sr and s

x
imply a stationary fertility rate n, which in turn implies a stationary et=h

t .
Taking the log of Yt = ctNt and Yt = ZtLx;t and then di¤erentiating with
respect to t yield
:
Y t
Yt
=
:
ct
ct
+ nt =
:
Zt
Zt
+
:
Lx;t
Lx;t
. (A1)
Combining (A1) and (21) yields
:
Lx;t
Lx;t
= 

1  nt


    . (A2)
Taking the log of sx;t  Lx;t=(htNt) and di¤erentiating with respect to t yield
:
sx;t
sx;t
=
:
Lx;t
Lx;t
 
:
ht
ht
  nt. (A3)
Substituting (A2) and (4) into (A3) yields
:
sx;t
sx;t
= 

1  nt

  et
ht

  . (A4)
Substituting (3) and lt = (sr;t + sx;t)ht into (A4) yields
:
sx;t = sx;t [(sr;t + sx;t)  ] . (A5)
To derive our second di¤erential equation, we rst rewrite (25) as
sr;t
sx;t
= 
vtt
Yt
, (A6)
where t = 's

r;t. Di¤erentiating the log of (A6) with respect to t yields
(1  )
:
sr;t
sr;t
=
:
sx;t
sx;t
+
:
vt
vt
 
:
Y t
Yt
. (A7)
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Substituting (14) into (A7) yields
(1  )
:
sr;t
sr;t
=
:
sx;t
sx;t
+ rt + t   t
vt
 
:
Y t
Yt
. (A8)
Substituting (5) and the rst equality of (A1) into (A8) yields
(1  )
:
sr;t
sr;t
=
:
sx;t
sx;t
+ + t   t
vt
. (A9)
Substituting (12) and (A6) into (A9) yields
(1  )
:
sr;t
sr;t
=
:
sx;t
sx;t
+ + t

1  (  1)sx;t
sr;t

, (A10)
Finally, we substitute (A5) and t = 's

r;t into (A10) to obtain
:
sr;t =
sr;t
1  
h
(sr;t + sx;t) + 's

r;t   '(  1)sx;t=s1 r;t
i
. (A11)
Di¤erential equations (A5) and (A11) describe the dynamics of (sx;t; sr;t).
Next we draw a phase diagram based on the system of di¤erential equa-
tions in (A5) and (A11). From (A5), the
:
sx;t = 0 locus in R2++ is given
by
sx;t = =   sr;t, (A12)
which describes a negative relationship between sx;t and sr;t. From (A11),
the
:
sr;t = 0 locus in R2++ is given by
sx;t =
sr;t + 's

r;t
'(  1)=s1 r;t   
, (A13)
for s1 r;t < '(   1)=. Equation (A13) describes a positive relationship
between sx;t and sr;t. As s
1 
r;t approaches '(   1)=, sx;t goes to innity.
Equation (30) implies that (sr)
1  < '(   1)=. The phase diagram is
plotted in Figure 1 along with the dynamics.
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The dynamical system is characterized by global instability in R2++, so
that the jump variables sx;t and sr;t shall immediately start from their steady
state values. More specically, the Jacobian of the di¤erential-equation sys-
tem (A5) and (A11), computed at the interior steady state (sx; s

r) 2 R2++,
is:

sx, s

x
sr
1 

   '(  1)=(sr)1 

, s

r
1 

 + '(sr)
 1 + (1  )(  1)sx=(sr)2 
  ,
with determinant equal to
sxs

r
1  

'
(sr)1 
+
(1  )(  1)sx
(sr)2 
+
'(  1)
(sr)1 

> 0.
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Since both determinant and trace are positive, the di¤erential-equation sys-
tem (A5) and (A11) is indeed locally unstable.
Next we use (6) to show that the stationarity of sx;t = sx and sr;t = s

r
implies nt is also stationary. Equation (13) and Yt = ctNt imply that
wtht=ct = 1=(s

x). We apply Yt = ctNt and at = vt=Nt to derive at=ct =
vt=Yt = (s

r)
1 =('sx), where the second equality follows from (A6). There-
fore, we can express (6) as

nt
=
1
sx

(sr)
1 
'
+
1

+
1


, (A14)
which implies nt = n. Finally, from (3) and lt = (sr+s

x)ht, the stationarity
of nt = n implies that et=ht must be stationary as well. Q.E.D.
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